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There is no doubt that a whole series of agreements
and arrangements, negotiated and initialled in Dayton and
in mid-December last year signed in Paris, have truly
invigorated the peace process, especially in the military
field.
After enormous human loss, suffering and
destruction, these agreements should re-establish an order
of peace, stability and good-neighbourly relations in
Southeastern Europe.
By their comprehensive and elaborate nature and
scope the Dayton Agreements have for the first time made
a comprehensive, lasting and viable peace and full
normalization of relations among the successor-states
more than just a mere possiblity.
However, whether the Dayton/Paris Accords will
in reality signify the end to the conflict or be just another
milestone along the way to peace in our region, is yet to
be seen.
Indeed, a true and lasting peace is at hand but much
depends on the parties and even more on the
determination and commitment of the international
community - that have been too often lacking in the past.
In the light of our recent history and experience, it
is obvious why Croatia is vitally interested in the peace
implementation, regional stability and cooperation, to be
crowned with a new security arrangement based on the
fact that five new states have replaced a former federal
state.
For obvious reasons Croatia wants to fully
participate in designing a new and comprehensive security
model for Europe in the twenty-first century. These new,
elaborate and coordinated structures - security, political
as well as economic - must prevent repetition of the past
grave experiences in Southeastern Europe or, for that
matter, anywhere else on our Continent.
The still existing network of international
organizations and mechanisms, including the security
architecture of the Euro-Atlantic realm, has proved to be
rather inadequate to deal efficiently and in a timely fashion
with the new environment and challenges of the post-Cold
War period.
This inadequacy is bound to prove even more
dangerous in similar situations which may, unfortunately,
be already unfolding at certain points throughout the
Euro-Atlantic belt.
Sovereignty, territorial integrity, even the bare
survival of small or newly emerged states have been
seriously threatened on our Continent, as well as in some
other parts of the world. With the re-emergence of some
of the most vicious political ideologies - of the so called
Left or the so called Right alike - and horrendous practices
from the recent past, the very foundations of the Western
civilization, not to mention the OSCE principles and
objectives, have been put to test.
In a situation like this, Croatia - as well as a number
of other small and newly emerged states, which are not a
part of any of the existing defense and security
arrangements yet - was forced to adopt a specific national
security and defense strategy which combines full
cooperation with the international community with a
strong emphasis on the principle and policy of self-
reliance.
This national strategy has proven to be most
effective in the existing international environment, and
my Government strongly believes that such Croatian
attitude, as well as its policy were crucial in the successful
completion of the peace settlement and agreement signed
in Paris on December 14, 1995.
At this point let me briefly address certain issues
regarding the origin and the root causes of the war, as
well as the long-term strategic thinking and philosophy
behind such Croatian policy.
It is true that linking full cooperation and self-
reliance may seem illogical, but Croatia's strategic choices,
as well as the international environment at the time, made
this linkage logical.
From the very beginning Croatia has been
determined to achieve two major objectives: one, to secure
its full independence and regain its territorial integrity,
and two, to secure a peace - first of all, a peace with its
neighbours, one that would not amount to a mere
"absence of war" but would more fully reflect, for instance,
Spinoza's definition of peace as "a virtue, a state of mind,
a disposition for benevolence, confidence and justice".
The key word is disposition for benevolence -
because such has been Croatia's disposition towards its
neighbours. For example, in 1991 Croatia did not want
war - just the contrary, Croatia proposed a confederation
and later on a commonwealth of independent states as a
peaceful, civilised and dignified way out of the crisis
already raging within the former Serb-dominated
Yugoslav federation. But the answer to such Croatian and
Slovenian proposals was the Serbian aggression and an
all-out war - first against Slovenia, a week later against
Croatia and then, the war reached its climax in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
In the beginning, immediately following the
declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia, in
late June of 1992, the Serbs said they were fighting for the
preservation of the SFR Yugoslavia. The JNA, the former
federal army, stated it was its constitutional right and
obligation to regain control of the Slovenian northern
borders - but in just a week JNA, as a matter of fact,
renounced this "constitutional obligation", let Slovenia
drift away "into secession" as it was called at the time,
and immediately redeployed its forces to swoop on
Croatia. This time to defend "the bare-handed and
6
unarmed Serbian minority gravely threatened by the
Croatian secessionist regime".
Why did the war reach its climax in Bosnia-
Herzegovina? In pre-war Slovenia there was almost no
Serbs to speak of; in Croatia they represented about 11
per cent of the total population; in Bosnia-Herzegovina
about one third. That is a part of the answer.
For a long time Croatia argued that the existence,
protection, survival of a minority, or implementation of
the minority rights, was neither the real cause of the war,
nor the origin of the conflict.
The core of the crisis and war, we argued, was the
so called Greater Serbian ideology or philosophy based
on a perverted and grossly outdated belief that "all the
Serbs have to live within one state", or that "Serbia is
wherever there are Serbs or Serbian graves". To put it
more simply: the Serbian elite or the leadership especially
outside Serbia proper, simply did not want to accept the
notion of living in a non-Serbian state. In order to achieve
this aim - that is, the Greater Serbia or a unified Serbian
state at the expense of at least three other nations - the
elite was prepared to go to the extremes in indoctrinating
and manipulating large masses of people, especially
outside Serbia - in the so called Krajina or "Republika
srpska". Not very many people were willing to listen to
our arguments at the time and many were too prone to
reduce the whole problem to the ethnic minority issue.
But in the light of what happened in the suburbs
of Sarajevo (Vogosca and Ilijas which, according to the
Dayton Agreements, became a part of the Federation), a
lot of policy makers, peace mediators and foreign affairs
specialists should rethink their positions, their policy and
their views as to what caused the war, or what was
happening in Croatia in early August last year.
Never in history has a minority or an ethnic
community been given such assurances, guarantees, even
incentives - economic and otherwise; never has the
international community amassed such a large contingent
of forces and amount of resources - including 60,000
IFOR soldiers, EU-mechanisms around Mr. Carl Bildt,
Ms. Elizabeth Rehn, the OSCE, to name just a few - in
order to guarantee, among other things, the survival, co-
habitation and protection of the rights of different ethnic
communities. Despite all that - due to the years of
indoctrination, conditioning and manipulation by the elite
in power, but also due to their present collective state of
mind. centuries-old myths and present obsessions - the
Serbs are nevertheless leaving the Sarajevo suburbs. They
took everything with them, burnt houses and left nothing
behind, not even the graves. Why? The answer is not just
uncertainty of a minority.
Actually the same thing happened in Croatia in
August, 1995. Tens of thousands of people left in an
organised evacuation campaign, responding the call of
their self-proclaimed leader Milan Martie who is now to
appear before the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. Their elite
and leadership in Knin would accept neither the Croatian
constitutional guarantees nor the Z-4 plan. The U.S.
Ambassador Peter Galbraith's appeals to Knin and Glina
Serbs in August went unheeded the same way as Carl
Bildt's recent calls to reason addressed to the Sarajevo
Serbs have been to no avail.
This shows how a myth can lead to a very brutal
and costly policy: first, the ideologists obsessed by the idea
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of Greater Serbia abused Yugoslavia in order to preserve
or establish their dominance; then they manipulated a
large mass of people and whipped them into a frenzy and
by force secured a territory envisaged as a part of Greater
Serbia. Following that, they are ethnically cleansing these
territoris of all non-Serbs - that is what happened in the
UN Protected Areas in Croatia or in Eastern Bosnia.
Basically, there is no difference between Vukovar and
Srebrenica.
In the end, when the self-styled elite realises that
its position is being threatened either by the
commencement of something like the Operation Storm
or even the implementation of the Dayton Accords, it in
fact undertakes a highly organised evacuation campaign -
while blaming the whole world for having engaged in an
anti-Serbian conspiracy.
A policy originated in a myth is thus coming to its
full cycle: ethnic cleansing of others ends up as ethnic self-
cleansing.
Faced with an agression and fully aware of its true
causes Croatia was forced to adopt the policy of linkage -
cooperation with the international community on one
hand, and self-reliance, on the other. It was the only way
to survive in the existing environment and at the same
time begin to gain full legitimacy and acceptance in the
international community.
The truth about the war was bound to come out
into the open sooner or later but that is by no means to
say that I personally or my Government rejoice in seeing
the Serbs flee the Sarajevo suburbs. It is a regrettable fact,
but still - a fact.
On the other hand, had Croatia not adopted a
policy of self-reliance, that is - had Croatia not undertaken
a series of decisive measures since the cancellation of the
UNPROFOR mandate in January 1995, we would have
been faced now with a situation in the area which could
be best described as mere preservation of the negative
status quo managed by an inactive international presence
such as UNPROFOR.
In other words, Croatia would not have
reintegrated a large part of its occupied territory, Bosnia-
Herzegovina would 'still be at war, Bihac still under siege
and, in the end, Serbia would still be under sanction. There
would be no real movement in the peace process because
there would be no change in the strategic balance of power
on the ground which has made the present peace process
possible.
After all diplomatic and mediating efforts aimed
at bringing the Croatian Serbs' leadership to the
negotiating table had proved futile, and following a series
of provocations and violations of the cease fire agreement,
Croatia liberated and reintegrated Western Slavonia in
early May 1995. Then we began publicly warning the
Security Council that the fall of Bihac into the Serbian
hands - after a thousand-day long siege and despite
numerous UN resolutions and NATO warnings - would
gravely endager the very security and integrity of Croatia,
because the Serbs would consolidate their territory
stretching from the Romanian border to the Adriatic.
At the same time we were witnessing the fall of
Srebrenica, Zepa and almost the whole of Eastern Bosnia
into the hands of Karadzic and Mladic Serb forces. Our
negotiations with the local Serbs were going nowhere, the
Bosniaks and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina at
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that time were at their lowest point - almost totally helpless
and at the mercy of Mladic and Karadzic who were openly
mocking the international community. No one was willing
to extend a helping hand to the Bosniaks.
On numerous occasions we sent out open warnings
that if something was not done to get the negotiations
with the local Serbs off the ground, to lift the siege of Bihac
and thus remove this threat from our borders, Croatia
would be forced to act decisively under the UN Charter
and exercise its right to self-defense. Nothing was done
and we did what we did - alone and togheter with the
Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats. Our pleas and
protestations, as well as those of the Bosniaks, went
unheeded.
In a perfectly executed police and military
operation lasting less than four days, we liberated well over
10,000 square kilometres of the occupied Croatian
territory; together with the Bosniaks and the Bosnian
Croats, and under the provisions of the Split Declaration
on Joint Defence, we lifted the siege of Bihac and went
on to liberate a large chunk of the Serbian occupied
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus coming very close
to the 49:51 ratio set by the Contact Group.
The tragic process was reversed and a completely
new strategic environment was created which - combined
with the effects of the sanctions and NATO air strikes
against selected Serbian targets in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina - actually made possible the so called
Holbrooke Peace Initiative and the Dayton process.
All this is the essence, demonstration or reflection
of the linkage between Croatia's cooperation with the
international community and its policy of self-reliance,
when needed; that is to say, when all the avenues leading
to a peaceful and negotiated solution are exhausted and
hopelessly closed, while the vital national interests and
survival are at stake.
Croatia is fully aware of the terrible price, both in
the loss of human lives and material resources, which we
have been forced to pay in the struggle to preserve our
national sovereignty, the democratic institutions and
territorial integrity, in defiance of all the obstacles. We
are also aware of the price we have had to pay on the
political and diplomatic front for our occasional acts
against the advice of certain powers not to resort to the
measures that could be classified as resorting to force, self-
defense or self-reliance.
But it has paid off: today we are negotiating the
implementation of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina; we are
negotiating the regional security and arms build-down
arrangements; we are negotiating normalisation of Serbo-
Croat relations; we are negotiating regional cooperation
in the Southeastern Europe, etc. The guns are silenced
and bullies are no longer dictating anybody's agenda.
The precarious situation in international relations
which I tried to outline in the forgoing passages, is not
favourable for the ongoing process of democratic
transition of the post-Communist societies. It is our firm
belief that this process cannot be accomplished until
international relations are also democratized. Moreover,
one could argue that the internal democratization and the
democratization of international affairs are the two facets
of one and indivisible historical process. Neither of these
two facets of the global democratization is possible
separately or in disregard of each other.
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By the democratization of international relations
my Government means an overall effort to "devise a
concept of security, which would be based on the strict
observance of and strict adherence to all OSCE principles
and commitments to ensure security in the next century".
To be more specific, and apart from our own national
experience, I am inclined to define the concept of
democratic international relations as equal security
provided for all member-states, irrespective of their area,
population and membership in the defense arrangements.
If we want a really stable, secure and peaceful
Europe in our times and for the generations to come, we
must not repeat the mistakes of the past. Briefly:
aggression or use of force against states should not be
ignored or met with indifference. The principle of peaceful
solution to international problems and disputes must be
strongly upheld.
The European integration process must be
strengthened and broadened to foster and further develop
the common European democratic values and standards,
as well as to safeguard the identity of all European nations.
In this process the existing organizations - the Council of
Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO, must have the moral
responsibility and enough strength to secure their leading
role.
The Dayton/Paris Accords and other
arrangements, should lead to the normalization of
relations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on
one hand, and Serbia/Mon tenegro, or FRY, on the other.
First the mutual recognition and eventually the full
normalization of state-to-state relations can pave the way
to the extension of the Pact of Stability in Europe to our
area, an important step in the process of accession to the
EU. The full normalization of relations is also tied to an
overall agreement to be reached on the succession by all
successor-states to the former Yugoslavia.
However, the key to the overall normalization in
the area is the peaceful reintegration of the last remaining
occupied Croatian territories - that is, Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium. I do belive, and I am rather
optimistic, that these areas will be reintegrated in a
peaceful manner. Croatia is satisfied with the UN Security
Council resolution in this regard; the local Serbs have for
the first time accepted the notion of peaceful reintegration
as elaborated in the UN resolutions and Erdut/Zagreb
agreements; Belgrade, including President Milosevic, has
repeatedly given assurances of their support to the process.
It is our firm belief that this process should be
intensified and completed with the assistance of the
international community. The end of the war and the
normalization of relations in the area will have many
positive effects, such as in the initial stage the reopening
of important international roads, railway and waterway
arteries and oil and gas pipelines, to the benefit of all the
states in the region, and Europe at large.
Further elaboration and introduction of a regional
system of arms control, confidence and security building
measures will be of particular importance. Apart from the
leading international factors, other countries in the region
can have a legitimate stake in these matters. Croatia
welcomes the talks and negotiations on regional security
and arms build-down currently under way in Vienna.
But the rehabilitation, reconstruction and
development of the areas most directly affected by the
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war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are at this point
of vital importance to the promotion of the Peace Accord
and for the creation of an economic, social and political
basis for future stability in the region.
The extent of destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia is terrible. Direct war damage in Croatia is
estimated to exceed 27 billion U.S. dollars.
There is no doubt that reconstruction and
rehabilitation will fundamentally determine the course of
events in the post-conflict period. Overall normalization
of life in the area - specifically and most urgently in the
areas directly affected by the war - could be speeded up
by reconstruction and rehabilitation projects and
programmes. This normalization is crucial for the political
processes and democratic institutions.
Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered most, but Croatia
was the first to experience the war and has suffered the
consequences of this aggresion longer than any other
country in the region. Bosnia-Herzegovina should be given
priority in the reconstruction and rehabilitation, but
Croatia must not be overlooked under any circumstances
- neither in short-term aid to alleviate the immediate
consequences of the war (refugees, displaced persons,
housing), nor in the medium and long term aid and
assistance (infrastructure, access to political integration,
capital markets, etc.).
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have to
be approached in the same manner, but they have to be
approached simultaneously - it is of more than just
symbolic significance. Such approach is necessary in the
light of ties being built between the two countries for the
future, as well as in the light of the fact that our economies
are closely interconnected, and will rely on each other
through the Federation arrangements, or the Cooperation
Council.
Furthermore, enhancing the relations with the
Bosniak-Croat Federation in various fields - from trade
and industrial cooperatioan, and from communications
to education - is seen in Croatia as a vital contribution to
the establishment of a new regional framework of security,
stability, co-operation and good-neighbourliness. Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina have already laid down the
foundations for such cooperation - fully in line with the
spirit and the letter of Dayton Agreements - by establishing
the Joint Cooperation Council.
At this point I would like to take the liberty of
stating briefly some basic facts about the extent of the
destruction Croatia has suffered. Gross Domestic Product
was almost halved in just two years following the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia: from 14 billion U.S.
dollars in 1990 to barely 7.5 billion in 1992. Due to the
constant decrease in economic growth, Croatia has lost at
least 13 billion U.S. dollars since the outbreak of the war
- or approximately one pre-war GDP. Almost one fourth
of the country has suffered enormous devastation and it
has to be rebuilt practically from the scratch. For example,
almost a quarter of a million of housing units have to be
repaired, many of them completely rebuilt. We are still
assessing the situation regarding the industrial facilities
and the true extent of the damage done to the
infrastructure.
All this clearly proves that Croatia needs
international aid and assistance in order to (a) stabilize
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its own economy, (b) assume its own proper place in the
long-term stabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
Southeastern Europe as a whole, and (c) begin to fully
integrate into Europe in a manner befitting a country of
its size.
It is often argued that Croatia has achieved
remarkable results in stabilizing its currency and economy
in general, that it is ready to finance its reconstruction
mostly by seeking credits and assistance from international
financial institutions and on capital markets. However,
these results have been achieved with great efforts and at
great social costs. The international community must - if
it wants a stable Croatia - help alleviate these costs by
extending, and if possible increasing aid and assistance
earmarked for dealing with the most pressing problems
arising from the grave humanitarian situation.
Should the international community adopt a policy
that basically amounts to directing Croatia to seek
financing for its reconstruction projects mostly through
the capital markets, this policy must be, r should say,
"softened and sweetened" on the political level by letting
my country join the European integration processes, as
well as the Western security arrangements, as soon as
possible and feasible.
However, I firmly believe that the international
community should adopt a combined approach to the
reconstruction of Croatia: a) in the initial phase, and along
with Bosnia-Herzegovina, immediate aid to help offset
the consequences of the humanitarian situation; b) aid,
credits and financing of infrastuctural projects necessary
for the future economic development of both countries;
c) separate arrangements for Croatia through the World
Bank, IMF, EBRD and capital markets; and d)
participation in the usual projects arising from fully
regulated relations with, for example, the European Union
and individual interested countries.
Such approach would enable Croatia to properly
deal with the post-war period. The absence of any of the
crucial ingredients of this approach would push Croatia
to the brink and prevent it from assuming its proper role
in the post-war normalization and stabilization of the
region.
With the prospects for sustainable peace firmly in
place, Croatia's policy priorities are now turning towards
the reconstruction of the country and its continuing path
towards economic prosperity. This also implies an active
attitude towards the advanced forms of regional
cooperation.
Croatia has entered into far-reaching economic
and political arrangements with the Bosniak-Croat
Federation. The agreement on Croat-Bosniak cooperation
is an open-ended and dynamic arrangement. While we
see in it considerable chances and interests for Croatian
enterprises, it has to be pointed out that close ties with
Bosnia also represent a considerable burden for Croatia.
We have accepted it as Croatia's contribution towards the
Bosnian peace arrangement.
The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina - to the
creation of which Croatia has been contributing for two
years now, since the signing of the Washington
Agreements two years to the present - has proved to be a
veritable foundation for a political settlement of the
conflict, and a framework in which the national and
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political rights of the Bosnian Croats, just as those of the
Bosniaks, can be preserved and fully protected.
Besides having a stable, prosperous and tranquil
neighbour, Croatia has only one basic interest in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and that is ensuring the equality of the
Bosnian Croats. Their political right to express and
preserve their national identity in all respects as one of
the constituent peoples within the sovereign state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina is the very essence of the viability of
peace.
For this reason Croatia lends its full and
unequivocal support to the Federation. We see a lasting
stability in relations between the two states, and in the
wider region as well, only through close cooperation
between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Republic of Croatia. There have been and there will be
certain problems along the way; there are people on both
sides who are against the idea of a Federation; but these
obstacles will be overcome and could be overcome as
recently demonstrated in Rome or a few days later at a
meeting between the two governments in Split.
In spite of facing the aftermath of war, Croatia also
stands ready to normalize and develop its economic and
other relations with Serbia and Montenegro at various
levels. Resuming regular trade with Serbia-Montenegro
would certainly be in the interest of both countries; it will
also be a notable contribution to the normalization of
economic conditions in all neighbouring states.
However, it is to be pointed out that Croatia's
commitment to cooperate intensively with the Bosniak-
Croat Fedration and its readiness to resume full economic
relations with Serbia do not reflect the full scope of our
key priorities. Croatia's key strategic interest and
overriding priority is our accession to the European
integrational groupings as soon as possbile.
Our ultimate goal is to become a full-fledged
member of the European Union and NATO. I am glad to
note that Croatia already meets a notable number of
requirements for regular membership in these
organizations.
We are aware that Croatia's accession to the
European Union and NATO can be achieved only through
a transition process involving some intermediary steps.
But we also appeal to these organizations to show more
understanding and appreciate the urgency of Croatia's
proper accession to these groupings.
It is also clear that Croatia has to enter into some
forms of preferential trading arrangements with some
European countries other than those of the former
Yugoslavia. The obvious candidates for such arrangements
would be our immediate neighbours i.e. Italy and Hungary
but also Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and other
Central European countries striving for accession to the
EU. These countries have already been assembled either
under the auspicies of the Central European Free Trade
Area (CEFTA), or under EFTA.
Croatia is interested in joining one or even both of
these integrational groupings with an understanding that
we would see our membership as an intermediary step
towards a full membership in the EU. With this goal in
I
9
view, Croatia is an active member of the C.E.I. and is
approaching both CEFT A and EFT A.
Croatia's eventual decision on entering a
preferential trade agreement with one of the existing
regional free trade areas is, however, subject to the
capability of the Croatian economy to cope with foreign
competition without unnecessary protectionism or trade
barriers.
Due to the extraordinary conditions created by the
war - including the huge influx of refugees - Croatia was
forced to maintain special levies and linear taxes on all
imports. Within the ongoing negotiations on Croatia's
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), we
are now on the way to gradually dismantle such taxes and
substitute them with the usual means of protection,
consistent with WTO regulations.
Consequently, we hope that the member-states of
CEFAT/EFTA will show understanding for Croatia's
trade problems by making an allowance for an appropriate
period needed for the Croatian economy to adjust to intra-
regional free trade.
The challenges ahead are great as regards the
implementation of the Agreements, the normalization of
relations and the elaboration of a system of good
neighbourly cooperation.
Reasonably assessing the advantages of peace,
Croatia is ready to play its part and contribute to the
enhancement of regional stability and security. Bearing
in mind the definite reintegration of the last remaining
occupied territories and the establishment of full
sovereignty over the whole national territory within the
internationally recognized borders, due to its strategic and
geopolitical features as a Central-European,
Mediterranean and Danubian democratic state, Croatia
will now dedicate all its efforts to the full realization of its
other national interests.
As I said, one of the main national interests and
goals is the full integration of Croatia in the political,
economic and security systems of Europe, a goal that has
been almost impossible to achieve during the war.
To be more specific, we expect what is most
important to us - an open door to the European integration
processes, that is: the Council of Europe, PHARE,
Cooperation Agreement and eventually Association
Agreement, and a place in the Partnership for Peace.
These would be the initial peace dividends - not
only for Croatia, but for the whole region, because a stable
Croatia, fully integrated into Europe, can be and will be a
crucial agent and guarantor of the regional stability. For
its part, as a strong, stable and democratic country, Croatia
is as ready as ever to be an active partner of the Euro-
Atlantic democracies in the establishment of a democratic
system of relations in Southeastern Europe.
Croatian membership and active participation in
the Council of Europe, the Partnership for Peace, and
finally in the EU and NATO, will be of crucial importance
not only for the stability, security and comprehensive
development of Croatia, but also for the stability, security
and peace in this region and in Europe at large.
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